During a visit to Burkina Faso, Mr. Ahmad, the Confederation of African Football’s (CAF) newly elected president, said that Cameroon would not be ready to organize an Africa Cup of Nations (CAN) with even four teams in 2019. The somewhat offensive character of the declaration may have contributed to hurting Cameroon’s national pride. However, beyond the polemic, what is the real intention of the new team of CAF with a 24-team CAN? Interviews with Mr. Ahmad and Mr. Constant Omari[i] respectively in Jeune Afrique[ii] and Radio France Internationale[iii] provide some explanations for the decision. The following is an analysis of CAF’s decision to move to a CAN-24 knowing that many countries have experienced difficulties organizing a 16-team CAN.
The recent history of the CAN displays the challenges of organizing a certain size of event in Africa. Hosting large-scale sporting competitions requires an investment in infrastructure beyond just stadiums and sports arenas. Aware of the unfulfilled needs and the deficiencies noticeable during the CAN, President Ahmad stated:
“I will be as uncompromising with Cameroon as I will be with Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea for the CAN of 2021 and 2023. We can no longer afford to organize African Cups where the pitch is in bad state, where medical services are insufficient, and where hotels do not meet the standard.”[iv]
Mr. Ahmad’s arguments for basic requirements are legitimate and commendable. However, considering the limited financial and structural abilities of a majority of African countries, hosting major competitions is a major undertaking. Stadiums, the sine qua non requirement for organizing a football competition, is the first test. A review of stadiums in Africa reveals their low capacity, not to mention the lack of quality conditions of the pitch, the ancillary equipment, and facilities. Few countries in the south of the Sahara, except South Africa and to some extent Nigeria, have the venue capacity to host the CAN without building new stadiums and renovating existing stadiums. North Africa and South Africa excluded, the vast majority of other countries can be placed among the least well-off in the world in terms of football infrastructure. The data provided by the World Stadium website[v] illustrate the limitations in the number of African stadiums of 10,000 places or more. Many countries in West Africa in this case have no more than two to three stadiums of more than 10,000 places. Among the countries that have more than six stadiums of 10,000 seats, a qualitative inventory is necessary to appreciate not only the practicability and the quality of the pitches, but also the state of the installations that can make stadiums sufficiently equipped and secured to accommodate a multiple-team international tournament. World Stadium Index,[vi] in its analysis of Ghana and Angola, two countries that hosted NACs in 2008 and 2010 respectively, indicated that both countries had to renovate and build stadiums to have the four stadiums necessary to host a 16- team CAN. For the majority of African countries in the south of the Sahara, substantial investments for stadium construction are necessary to meet the international standards.
Beyond the difficulty of constructing the stadiums, the challenges for the host nations are also complex. Indeed, while African competitions do not consistently involve thousands of spectators from other countries, there is a minimum spectator capacity necessary for any competition in terms of hotels, telecommunications, and air and road transport. These elements pose real challenges for the host country.
In most African countries, territorial imbalances in equipment and infrastructure of all kinds remain blatant. Stadiums, schools, hospitals, administrations, and other infrastructure are often concentrated in the capital and at most a second city. Territorial imbalances between capital and at most a second urban center and the rest of the country are substantial. Hotels of a certain standard, paved roads and highways, reliable access to the Internet and other communication infrastructures, and public transport—all these elements, when they exist, are often concentrated in the capital city and/or the main economic center. Wanting to host an international competition beyond the capital city means upgrading the infrastructures in small towns that will host part of the competition. Not only must the magnitude of the necessary investments be faced but also delays. These factors compromise the quality of sites other than the capital. What happens after the tournament? The investments, especially those in the hotel industry and in many cases the stadiums necessary for the competition will no longer have an optimal use beyond the tournament. Most likely only a few clubs outside the capital have the standing and the means to manage and maintain an infrastructure designed for an international competition. The stadium will therefore be oversized for the local club, underused, and poorly maintained.
Additionally, in Africa more than elsewhere, the economic impact of sporting events is far from being demonstrated. Most of the African countries’ federations are often without means. There has not yet been demonstrated much economic viability for hosting sporting events. As for the national teams, insignificance characterizes the private investment, and the government’s contributions are minimal and irregular.
But unlike hotels and stadiums, whose investments have a high risk of creating white elephants, necessary investments in telecommunications will have a reach far beyond the event. In fact, the vast majority of African countries, despite their progress, continue to have limited and expensive Internet capabilities. When electricity supply does not get in the way, Internet infrastructure and low bandwidth for data transfer remains precarious. Sports journalists are often the first to be handicapped by the Internet’s low quality in stadiums and hotels.[vii] Insufficient or slow bandwidths, power outages, or failures of servers are common for these users in need of reliable resources.
In general, investments in non-sporting infrastructure to create a CAN have often been the most difficult obstacle to overcome. This infrastructure is part of multi-sector planning that should be based on a foresight established by the host countries’ governments. Hosting a CAN is therefore only a catalyst and accelerator for whatever infrastructure upgrade is initially planned. Unfortunately prospective rarely integrates the host countries.
In the context of the challenges just discussed, the question is what the rationale behind the CAF decision for a 24-team CAN and the decision to leave only two years to the next host, Cameroon, to review its plans and extend its capacity from a 16-team CAN to a 24-team CAN. The CAF expresses ambitions for African football, but also the desire for more equity in the award of the CAN, and also a greater concern for the interest of the players. Indeed in the interview with Radio France International, Mr. Constant Omari declares,
“We decided to put the players at the center of the CAN with stadiums, hotels, clinics in good conditions. Things have to change. We have ambitions. We must give the chance to football emerging countries. The new governance has been elected on the basis of a program.”[viii]
Mr. Omari’s statements are legitimate. But it is difficult to make a working link among all of the factors: more teams, more investment for the host country, a focus on the interest of players, and finally the opportunity for other countries in often overlooked regions to host the CAN. A brother set of specifications with a growing need for infrastructure may have the advantage of reducing the pool of potential candidates capable of hosting the CAN, but certainly not to increase it in the African context. Withdrawals from countries designated to host continental championships are not uncommon. African countries able to host an African competition in optimal conditions are not legion. Falling commodity prices and especially oil prices have contributed to further reduce the list where oil-producing countries like Angola, Congo Brazzaville, and Nigeria are less and less inclined to commit their domestic resources to the organization of African competitions with no economic viability.
When FIFA wanted to move the World Cup from 32 teams to 48, a nine-year timeframe was allotted. This timeframe is quite different than the less than two years imposed by CAF on Cameroon to change their plans from a 16-team to a 24-team tournament. Mr. Omari commented:
“The difference is simple, the procedure of attribution with FIFA is that as soon as you have the attribution you sign a contract, which is not the case with the CAF. So it means if a contract binding the CAF and the organizing country had been signed, at this time the CAF will be in difficulty. We have ambitions. Today if at the level of the World Cup is expected to increase from 32 to 48 teams, it means that we must prepare accordingly. Today in Africa the last CAN has shown us that it has new emerging football countries, but they did not have the much chance, when I take East Africa which doesn’t have much the opportunity to qualify a country. Today when I see Southern Africa, when I see Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Botswana they are young nations. We decided to move to 24 nations. If 24 nations out of 54 can participate in a final phase, it will them pull up ….. We decided to raise the quality of our competitions …. even quantitatively to showcase our players.”[ix]
Mr. Omari’s arguments about the decision to move to a 24-team final tournament starting in 2019 when the CAN organizers’ bid for 2019 and 2021 were set for a 16-team tournament opened the door to controversies. Did the new CAF management team harbor the motive to put Cameroon in trouble for 2019 and consequently to withdraw the organization from the competition in 2019? The competition would therefore be awarded to a country ready for 24 teams—that would be Morocco. Without entering the controversial debate between CAF and Cameroon, we must recognize that CAF is showing a historical myopia that does not take into account the financial, structural, and political difficulties that have often characterized the hosting of the CAN. A tournament with more teams in an unchanged time frame is certainly not the most judicious way to push Cameroon to be a better host than it would have been with fewer teams. Beyond the procedural problems with Cameroon, the argument of preparing Africa for the World Cup at 48 in 2026 with more African participants is a defendable argument. Indeed the institutional experience that can represent the participation of national teams in major tournaments is important. The planning and management of a tournament by the management of the national teams is an experience that is acquired only through participation. But are the potential gains in management valid on the field and the overall level of teams? The countries cited by Mr. Omari are examples that are difficult to validate. Indeed, Botswana, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Uganda, and Tanzania are all countries that have participated in the CAN at least once. This does not seem to have resulted in a consistent improvement in their continental competitiveness. Even with a grain of validity, the correlation of participation in the CAN with a rise in the level of football in a country would be very difficult to demonstrate.
However, CAF’s concern to raise the general level of football in Africa is legitimate. It is hoped that the concern be accompanied by more substantial measures than simply to have a competition with more teams. For a true rise of African football, the continent has a large list of challenges to overcome: the quality of the infrastructure, the chronic lack of trained managers and coaches at all levels and visionary leaders in the federations and clubs, the limit of financial means, and the export-orientated youth talent development.
The CAF can certainly appreciate the attention and respect internationally gained by the mass of quality expatriate players. But can this attention, which has allowed CAF to sign relatively lucrative TV and media contracts, be a factor in the development of African football? Certainly there is significant progress made in the average quality of African football especially at the CAN. But like the African economies, exporting talents when the players are 18 years (and have them back, once “formed” by the European clubs, to play the CAN) does not tell the whole story of African football. Can the CAN be used as a barometer of the development of African football? To a degree, yes, because many players start their football classes in Africa. But beyond their European careers and successes, African football played in Africa remains in a challenging economic and structural state.
The report of Fifpro,[x] the association of professional players, on the state of football players in the world shows how far African football has to go to achieve its dream of professionalization and become a valuable, legitimate sector for young people to have a career by playing football.
Beyond the controversy Ahmad–Cameroon, it is essential to look at the situation of African football. The debate on the decision to move to a 24-team CAN in a very short time period will continue for a moment. Nevertheless, beyond the punctual debate on the preparation (or not) of Cameroon with personal and political implications, questions about the limits and challenges of African football should be more often debated by the CAF and its critics.
[i] Mr. Constant Omari était l’invité de Radio Foot International une émission Radio France International le jeudi 10 août https://footballmap.fifpro.org/assets/2016_FIFPRO_GLOBAL_EMPLOYMENT_REPORT.pdf\
[ii] Ahmad Ahmad: « On ne peut plus organiser de CAN là où les infrastructures sont insuffisantes » http://www.jeuneafrique.com/mag/465778/societe/ahmad-ahmad-on-ne-peut-plus-organiser-de-can-la-ou-les-in frastructures-sont-insuffisantes/ August 17, 2017
[iii] Mr. Constant Omari was invited by « Radio Foot International » Radio France International show on Thursday August 10, 2017
[iv] Mr. Constant Omari’s interview with Radio France International show on Thursday August 10, 2017
[v] http://www.worldstadiums.com/africa/maps/africa.shtml
[vi] https://dspace.mah.se/bitstream/handle/2043/21205/world_stadium_index_final.pdf?sequence=2 Alm, J., Tofft-Jørgensen, L., Brandt, H., & Bang, S. (2012). World Stadium Index: Stadiums built for major events: bright future or future burden?
[vii] Le Journaliste Sportif Face aux Défis de l’Afrique http://gerard.aaakindes.org/fr/category/articles-fr/
[viii] Mr. Constant Omari’s interview with Radio France International show on Thursday August 10, 2017
[ix] Constant Omari: « la CAF n’a jamais voulu retirer la CAN 2019 au Cameroun » http://afriquefoot.rfi.fr/20170810-constant-omari-caf-jamais-voulu-retirer-can-cameroun
[x] https://footballmap.fifpro.org/assets/2016_FIFPRO_GLOBAL_EMPLOYMENT_REPORT.pdf